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Legal Pragmatism Defended
Richard A. Posnert
The book ostensibly reviewed by my distinguished academic col-
league Richard Epstein'-Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy -offers
pragmatic accounts both of adjudication and of democracy.2 Epstein,
no fan of democracy, is interested only in my analysis of adjudication.
He treats my analysis of democracy as a trivial variant of the public-
choice theory of politics, which emphasizes interest groups. But central
to my analysis is the claim that politicians should be viewed as princi-
pals in the political process, not just, as in public-choice theory, agents
of interest groups) The claim may be right or wrong, but as it is central
to the theory of democracy expounded in the book and takes up more
than a hundred pages, one might have expected some discussion of it.
There is none (beyond a one-page brush off); nor is there any mention
of my applications of the theory, to election law or to the contested
2000 presidential election.
Against legal pragmatism Epstein levels the standard charge that
it is contentless, but he ignores my endeavor to give it content. The fol-
lowing passage from my book sketches my response to the charge of
contentlessness:
1. Legal pragmatism is not just a fancy term for ad hoc adjudica-
tion; it involves consideration of systemic and not just case-
specific consequences.
2. Only in exceptional circumstances, however, will the pragmatic
judge give controlling weight to systemic consequences, as legal
formalism does; that is, only rarely will legal formalism be a
pragmatic strategy. And sometimes case-specific circumstances
will completely dominate the decisional process.
3. The ultimate criterion of pragmatic adjudication is reasonable-
ness.
t Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The University of
Chicago Law School. This is a reply to Richard A. Epstein, The Perils of Posnerian Pragmatism,
71 U Chi L Rev 639 (2004), reviewing my book Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard
2003).
I Richard A. Epstein, The Perils of Posnerian Pragmatism, 71 U Chi L Rev 639 (2004).
2 Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard 2003).
3 See id at 130-249.
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4. And so, despite the emphasis on consequences, legal pragma-
tism is not a form of consequentialism, the set of philosophical
doctrines (most prominently utilitarianism) that evaluates actions
by the value of their consequences: the best action is the one with
the best consequences. There are bound to be formalist pockets
in a pragmatic system of adjudication, notably decision by rules
rather than by standards. Moreover, for both practical and juris-
dictional reasons the judge is not required or even permitted to
take account of all the possible consequences of his decisions.
5. Legal pragmatism is forward-looking, regarding adherence to
past decisions as a (qualified) necessity rather than as an ethical
duty.
6. The legal pragmatist believes that no general analytic proce-
dure distinguishes legal reasoning from other practical reasoning.
7. Legal pragmatism is empiricist.
8. Therefore it is not hostile to all theory. Indeed, it is more hospi-
table to some forms of theory than legal formalism is, namely
theories that guide empirical inquiry. Legal pragmatism is merely
hostile to the idea of using abstract moral and political theory to
guide judicial decisionmaking.
9. The pragmatic judge tends to favor narrow over broad grounds
of decision in the early stages of the evolution of a legal doctrine.
10. Legal pragmatism is not a supplement to formalism, and is
thus distinct from the positivism of H.L.A. Hart.
11. Legal pragmatism is sympathetic to the sophistic and Aristo-
telian conception of rhetoric as a mode of reasoning.
12. It is different from both legal realism and critical legal stud-
ies.'
These points are elaborated in chapter after chapter of the book.
Epstein could grant all twelve points yet still argue that legal
pragmatism is too vague and subjective to be an appropriate lodestar
for U.S. judges. My reply would be that all the other approaches to ju-
dicial decisionmaking that are on offer, including Epstein's, are no less
vague and subjective. For though Epstein has, as I explain in my re-
view of his book, changed his legal philosophy over the years, he has
4 Id at 59-60 (footnote omitted).
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not changed his policy views; and it is apparent that they well out of
temperamental and other personal factors, and political convictions,
rather than being generated by jurisprudential theory. In any event, he
ignores my twelve points completely,' not to mention their elabora-
tion, and instead bases his criticisms of the book on a series of misun-
derstandings.
The first and longest part of his "review" is devoted to a discus-
sion of issues of tort law. This is remarkable. My book contains no in-
dex reference to tort law and only a handful of scattered sentences
pertaining to it. Epstein refers to a single one of these sentences: "The
'reasonable person' standard of tort law is fundamental. 6 The sen-
tence appears in a list of legal doctrines that use "reasonableness" as a
legal criterion. (Another entry in the list is the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, which makes a promise that is relied on enforceable even
if not supported by consideration, provided the reliance was
"reasonable.")
From this innocent example, Epstein infers that I have aban-
doned the economic approach to tort law and that I now believe that
every tort case should be decided by asking whether the defendant
was negligent within the meaning of the Hand formula - conceived of
no longer as an economic formula but as an implementation of legal
pragmatism. Epstein is off base in two respects. The first is in thinking
that I want to replace economic analysis of tort law with pragmatic
analysis of tort law. As I make clear in the book, I continue to believe
that deciding common law cases in a way that will promote economic
efficiency is the right way for judges to go; it is also the pragmatic way.
Pragmatism need not displace specific legal approaches, as distinct
from guiding the choice among them.
The second mistake, though it has almost nothing to do with my
book (which does not even mention the Hand formula), is to suppose
that I believe-that I have ever believed-that the right way to decide
every tort case is to apply the Hand formula to it, in which event tort
law would contain a single standard (B < PL) and no rules.] This
would mean that I thought tort law had no place for strict liability, the
doctrine of assumption of risk, the last clear chance rule, the defenses
5 As when he says that "Posner actively distances himself from consequentialist reasoning
generally." Epstein, 71 U Chi L Rev at 650 (cited in note 1).
6 Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy at 74 (cited in note 2).
7 That is, negligence is failure to take precautions when the burden of the precautions (B)
is less than the loss if the accident that the precautions would have prevented occurs (L) dis-
counted (multiplied) by the probability that the accident will occur unless the precautions are
taken (P). Hence B < PL.
8 See Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy at 78 (cited in note 2).
9 Recall point 4 in the indented quotation, see text accompanying note 4, where I said that
rules have a place in a system of pragmatic adjudication.
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of public and private necessity, liability for defamation in cases of re-
publication, and the "reasonable person" rule itself, which bases the
duty of care on average capabilities rather than on the idiosyncratic
capabilities of particular injurers and victims. All these are economi-
cally sensible doctrines that I have no desire to see abrogated, as
should be obvious from even a cursory glance at my writings on tort
law.' Much of Epstein's purported review of my book is devoted to
contesting a view of that law which I have never held (though it is less
contestation than a summary of Epstein's own preferred rules of tort
law).
But in the course of that irrelevant diatribe, he lets slip an obser-
vation that reveals the inadequacy of the utilitarian philosophy that he
expounds in his book. He says, "If one allows the defendant [in a rape
case] to argue that the benefits of the rape that he committed exceed
its costs, the number of false positives is likely to be enormous. The per
se rule (limited by a defense of consent) stops that erosion at the small
price of disallowing the one case in a million where the claim might be
true."" The implication is that, were there no risk of legal error, it
should be a defense to a rape case that the rapist, perhaps a sadist, ob-
tained more pleasure from the act than the victim suffered pain. Ex-
amples such as this merely show that utilitarianism is an inadequate
guide to law.
The rest of the "review," except for the single page on my democ-
ratic theory," is an extended criticism of me for having an insuffi-
ciently aggressive conception of the judicial role in enforcing constitu-
tional rights. Epstein incorrectly states that I do not believe that con-
stitutional rights should be justiciable at all." This mistake leads him
repeatedly to mischaracterize my evaluation of specific constitutional
decisions, such as Lochner v New York.'4 I did not, as he believes, pro-
nounce the decision unpragmatic; I merely said there were pragmatic
considerations on both sides," concluding: "All that is certain is that
10 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 167-213 (Aspen 6th ed
2003). See also William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law
(Harvard 1987).
1 Epstein, 71 U Chi L Rev at 649 (cited in note 1). He means false negatives, that is, ac-
quittals of guilty defendants. A false positive would be convicting the innocent.
12 Seeidat651.
13 Epstein states:
The critical question for Posner is whether his deep conviction on the permanence of inter-
est group politics should lead him to support the effort to add judicial review of legislation
into an already unstable brew. My clear answer to this question has always been an em-
phatic vote for judicial review. His, like Holmes's, turns out to be a resounding vote against
it.
Id at 652.
14 198 US 45 (1905).
15 See Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy at 78-79 (cited in note 2).
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Lochner was no more willful than aggressive modern decisions such as
Roe v. Wade."'" Epstein acknowledges that I do not discuss Plessy v
Ferguson," but says that "[a]lthough he [Posner] does not quite say it,
the implication seems to be that he thinks that Plessy was correct
when decided."'" And he claims that I "bravely, if foolishly, defend[]
the Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu, on the ground that the
squeamish fail to understand how in wartime the grand test of reason-
ableness requires national security to trump claims of individual lib-
erty."'" Actually, I didn't defend the decision, though I criticized Justice
Jackson's dissent for its internal inconsistency (unremarked by Ep-
stein)."
It is careless of Epstein to misrepresent what I said about these
cases. (It is apparent that he did not read my book carefully.) What he
could have said, however, which would have had the merit of accuracy,
is that I am more sympathetic to these decisions than he is. Part of the
reason, though only a small part, is factual; I have in mind his risible
suggestion that by May 9, 1942, when the Japanese exclusion order
(upheld in the Korematsu decision) took effect (though it had been is-
sued in March), "the Battle of the Coral Sea had been won, [and] the
Japanese advance had been thwarted. '2' The Battle of the Coral Sea-
so far from being a clear-cut victory for the United States that the loss
of the Lexington, one of our few carriers, in the battle was concealed
from the American public until the victory at the Battle of Midway in
June 2-was fought on May 7 and 8, so could hardly have been a
ground for rescinding the exclusion order on the ninth, which was far
too soon to evaluate the consequences of the battle. And the Japanese
advance had not been thwarted by May; Japan remained on the offen-
sive, attacking Midway the following month.
But these are details, and the real difference between us concern-
ing these cases is that I am reluctant to make hindsight judgments, es-
pecially judgments designed to make me look more intelligent and
more morally sensitive than the people of earlier epochs. When
Lochner was decided in 1905, a large body of respectable opinion held
that laws fixing minimum wages and maximum hours of work were
enlightened measures that would improve the welfare of the working
class at negligible social cost. ' (Many economists now believe, as do
16 Id at 79. See Roe v Wade. 410 US 113 (1973).
17 163 US 537 (1896).
18 Epstein, 71 U Chi L Rev at 655 (cited in note 1).
19 Id at 655-56 (footnote omitted). See also Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944).
20 See Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy at 293-94 (cited in note 2).
21 Epstein, 71 U Chi L Rev at 657 (cited in note 1).
22 See H.P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, Feb-
ruary to June 1942 286,515 (Naval Institute 1983).
23 Epstein suggests that the issue of health in Lochner should have been whether
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Epstein and I, that this view was mistaken.) The question for the Su-
preme Court was whether to invalidate such measures on the ground
that they deprived employers of "liberty of contract," a term not
found in the Constitution, in circumstances constituting a denial of
"due process of law," a term not obviously related to the content of a
law as distinct from its form or the circumstances of its enactment or
application. Holmes pointed out in his dissent that to invalidate New
York's maximum-hours law would require the Court to choose be-
tween economic theories, for it could hardly be thought that the fram-
ers of the Constitution had made the choice for the Justices.24 By
knocking down the law, the Court impeded, though as it turned out
only rather trivially, what amounted to a social experiment. I thus see
Holmes's dissent as the precursor to the majority opinion in the recent
school-voucher case." The goal of school vouchers is to enlarge paren-
tal choice and to place competitive pressure on the public schools; but
because most private schools are parochial schools, there is a worry
that a voucher system would give a boost to religion. No one could
predict how big a boost (there might be none, since a voucher system
would stimulate the creation of new secular private schools) and
whether there would be offsetting educational benefits. The sensible
approach, adopted by the Court, is to allow individual cities to adopt
voucher systems, thus setting the stage for a social experiment that
will answer the critical questions, impossible to do in advance.
As for Plessy v Ferguson, the claim by the Court's majority that
"separate but equal" would offend blacks only if they chose to be of-
fended was ridiculous. It must have been obvious by 1897 that the
purpose of segregation was to keep blacks down. The hard question is
whether it would have been feasible for the Supreme Court to have
dismantled segregation at so early a date. I suspect it would not have
been. I doubt that the southern states would have complied with the
Court's orders or that the federal government would have called out
the army (at that time of trivial size) to enforce them, risking a re-
newal of the Civil War. Invalidating segregation would probably have
been a quixotic gesture. It might have burnished the Court's record in
Lochner's bread (the law in question limited bakers to working ten hours a day) was wholesome.
Epstein, 71 U Chi L Rev at 654 (cited in note 1) ("The protection of health might justify the New
York law, but no one said Lochner's bread was not wholesome or that hours legislation was bet-
ter than inspecting the finished product of all firms."). The actual issue was the bakers' health. It
is unclear why their health should be less deserving of protection than consumers' health.
24 See Lochner, 198 US at 75-76 (Holmes dissenting).
25 See Zelmnan v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639,652 (2002):
[Wlhere a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assis-
tance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious
schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the pro-
gram is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.
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history, but at the cost of underscoring the Court's weakness, and per-
haps encouraging future defiance of its decisions. A court, as Epstein
fails to understand, cannot get too far ahead of public opinion.
And finally Korematsu. Epstein seems to disagree not with my
approach, but only with its application to the facts of the case, a
disagreement unrelated to the merits of legal pragmatism. In March
1942, when the exclusion order was issued, there was considerable
doubt in government circles that the order was necessary or appropri-
ate.27 The decision to issue it was, moreover, tainted by racial hostility;'
and in retrospect we know that few if any persons subject to the order
(the most suspicious characters among Japanese living in the United
States having been rounded up earlier) were disloyal-this was a pos-
sible justification for the subsequent enactment of a statute providing
monetary reparations to them. It's a different question, however,
whether President Roosevelt was mistaken to issue the order. To an-
swer that question we have to think ourselves into the minds of the
American people three months after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese army
and navy were on a rampage, and there were fears of an invasion of
the West Coast. Unprepared at the time of Pearl Harbor, our armed
forces were on the defensive in March and would be incapable of of-
fensive action for months. In these parlous circumstances it was natu-
ral, maybe inevitable, to resolve all doubts in favor of taking whatever
measures of self-defense seemed feasible; for it may well be vital to
morale in wartime that a nation's leaders show themselves resolute,
unflinching, and even brutal in the prosecution of the war.9 Does Ep-
stein think that, had he been an adult in 1942, he would have criticized
Roosevelt's order?
I would not be comfortable having judges who think as Professor
Epstein does decide such questions, and not only because of his shaky
hold on the military situation that confronted the nation at the time of
the exclusion order. He suggests the following alternatives: a curfew
(hardly calculated to prevent Fifth Column activities), a loyalty oath
(which the disloyal would sign with alacrity), and, for the sake of
26 That, at any rate, is how I read the following rather murky passage:
The root mistake [in Korematsu] lies, he [Posner] tells us, "in the prioritizing of liberty,"
which Posner translates into familiar marginalist terms. Is the extra element of security to
society greater than the extra cost? Admit the force of this general statement, and Kore-
matsu remains the "disaster" it was branded at the time.
Epstein, 71 U Chi L Rev at 656 (cited in note 1) (footnote and citations omitted).
27 See id at 657.
28 See Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents: Japanese American Internment as Foreign Af-
fairs Law, 40 BC L Rev 179, 226-32 (1998).
29 So at least I have argued, with reference to the severe measures that Britain took against
suspected subversives during the dark days of World War II. in Richard A. Posner, Overcoming
Law 164-67 (Harvard 1995).
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equity, a roundup of persons of German descent as well-which would
have been absurd, since they were scattered among the states, mainly
in the Midwest, and were not, like the Japanese, in the direct path of a
feared invasion. These suggestions confirm the reluctance expressed in
my book to entrust lawyers with responsibility for making judgments
of national security.'
30 See Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy at 292-321 (cited in note 2).
[71:683
